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This paper is partially to refute the submissions by Gulati’s article recently published on Beijing Law Re-
view which proposes abandoning the requirement of proving intention to create legal relations for the 
formation of an enforceable contract. After a critical analysis of the abandonists’ arguments, this paper 
argues that intention to create legal relations is the “marrow of contractual relationships” and the argu-
ments for abandoning such a requirement because of the existence of consideration and/or offer and ac-
ceptance as test(s) of contractual enforceability is untenable and unconvincing. Consideration and/or offer 
and acceptance may be evidence of serious intention to be bound somehow but unnecessary intention to 
be bound legally. For a number of reasons, the doctrine of consideration is very unlikely to work any bet-
ter than the intention to create legal relations test. If a test of contractual enforceability must be abandoned, 
that should be the doctrine of consideration rather than the intention to create legal relations. This paper 
compares the current positions of some common law jurisdictions, upholds the needs of stability, consis-
tency, and the harmonisation of contract law in the modern global era, and proposes a conservative ap-
proach of contract law reform regarding the intention requirement and the related presumptions, that is, all 
common law jurisdictions should “go back” to the orthodox English position. 
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Introduction 
Recently, Beijing Law Review published an article written 
by Bhawna Gulati, entitled “‘Intention to Create Legal Rela- 
tions’: A Contractual Necessity or an Illusory Concept” (Gulati, 
2011). Gulati suggests that “intention to create legal relations” 
is not a contractual necessity but an illusory concept and 
“strongly argues for abandoning the requirement of proving an 
‘intention to create legal relation’ in case of countries that re- 
quire the existence of ‘consideration’ for forming a valid and 
enforceable contract” (ibid, p. 132). 
Gulati (2011) raises again the interesting issue whether the 
“intention to create legal relations” should be a separate re- 
quirement, additional to agreement (offer and acceptance) and 
consideration, for the formation of a legally enforceable con- 
tract. The word “again” is used here because there has been a 
long-lasting debate on this issue and the argument for aban- 
doning the requirement of (proving) intention to create legal 
relations (or intent to contract or contractual intention) is not 
new (Williston, 1957; Hepple, 1970). 
For the convenience of discussion, this paper labels “aban- 
donists” those who argue for or propose abandoning the “inten- 
tion to create legal relations” as a requirement for the formation 
of a contract. This paper will critically analyse the abandonists’ 
arguments. Contrary to the abandonists’ view, this paper argues 
that intention to create legal relations is not an illusory concept 
but a necessity for the formation of a legally enforceable con- 
tract; and that consideration and/or offer and acceptance are not 
substitutes for such an intention requirement. If something must 
be exiled from common law, than that should be consideration 
rather than intention to create legal relations. This paper will 
also compare the current positions, regarding this issue, of 
some common law jurisdictions, namely, the United Kingdom 
(England), the United States, Australia and New Zealand. They 
seem to represent three different types of treatment of the inten-
tion to create legal relations and the related presumptions; and 
any of other common law jurisdictions seem to adopt one of 
these three positions. On the bases of the critical analysis and 
the comparison, and taking into account the need of harmonisa- 
tion and unification of contract law in the modern “global era”, 
this paper proposes a conservative approach of contract law 
reform regarding the intention to create legal relations require- 
ment, that is, common law jurisdictions should “go back” to the 
orthodox position of English law. 
A Critical Analysis of the Abandonists’  
Arguments 
It is uncontroversial that courts should not enforce all agree- 
ments/promises made. The law must devise test(s) to distin- 
guish enforceable contracts from unenforceable agreements/ 
promises. Many contract law doctrines/principles/rules are po- 
tentially capable of playing this “distinguishing role”. Leaving 
aside those concerning “formality”, “vitiating factors” and con- 
tract interpretation, the doctrines of offer and acceptance, con- 
sideration and intention to create legal relations are most rele- 
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vant, regarding the formation of an enforceable contract. In the 
past decades, various arguments have been raised against the 
intention to create legal relations requirement. It is worthwhile 
to undertake a critical analysis of the abandonists’ arguments in 
order to draw a plausible and convincing conclusion on this 
important contract law issue. 
Consideration and Intention to Create Legal  
Relations 
The most often raised and seemingly strongest argument for 
abandoning the intention to create legal relations requirement 
for the formation of an enforceable contract is that there already 
exists the doctrine of consideration as a test of legal enforce- 
ability hence the intention test is superfluous and unnecessary 
(Williston, 1957). This argument alone is insufficient to prove 
the redundancy of the intention to create legal relations re- 
quirement (intention test). A counter argument can equally be 
raised: the doctrine of consideration is unnecessary because 
there already exists another test of legal enforceability—the 
intention to create legal relations (Chloros, 1968). For the ar- 
gument that the intention test should be abandoned to be con- 
vincing, at least such points must be proved: 1) the doctrine of 
consideration is sufficient to cover the functions of the intention 
test; and either 2) the doctrine of consideration is necessary for 
contract law or for an enforceable contract so it cannot be abol- 
ished, or 3) the doctrine of consideration (consideration test) 
works better than the intention test. Research finds, however, 
this is an extremely tough or impossible task for the abandon- 
ists. 
Is the Doctrine of Consideration Sufficient to Cover the  
Functions of the Intention Test? 
It has been noted that “the courts and the writers are unani- 
mous that proof of serious intention is required” (ibid, p. 140) 
for an agreement to be enforceable. The essence of the intention 
test is that for an agreement to be enforceable the parties must 
intend to be legally bound by the agreement. It is argued that 
“the consideration itself can be taken as a proof strong enough 
to indicate the presence of intention of forming a legally bind-
ing contract” so a separate requirement of (proving) intention to 
create legal relations is “superfluous” (Gulati, 2011: p. 132). 
This argument obviously overlooks the circumstances where 
consideration could be found but the agreement is still unen-
forceable due to the parties indicate, expressly or impliedly, 
that they do not intend to be legally bound by the agreement. 
Consideration may be said a strong evidence to indicate the 
presence of the parties’ intention to be bound somehow, but 
unnecessarily to be bound legally. It is true that the existence of 
consideration very often indicates the parties’ seriousness about 
undertaking some kind of obligation, but unnecessary a legal 
obligation (Kimel, 2003: p. 138). Consideration may indicate 
the parties’ serious intention to be bound but unnecessarily the 
intention to be legally bound. 
It is widely accepted that freedom of contract is a valuable 
and fundamental principle of contract law. Freedom from con- 
tract is a corollary of freedom of contract. People should be 
allowed to make a contract (which is legally enforceable), and 
should equally be allow to make an agreement that is not le- 
gally enforceable but relying on trust, fidelity, love, affection, 
confidence and/or close relationships between the parties and/or 
other moral and social norms. “Making a legally binding agree- 
ment should be voluntary” (ibid, p. 132). 
It might be argued that exclusion of courts’ jurisdiction is il- 
legal so the parties’ intention to exclude their agreement from 
being enforced by courts should not be upheld. There is a sig- 
nificant and substantial difference between exclusion of courts’ 
jurisdiction and exclusion of the legal enforceability of an 
agreement. A party to an agreement with a clause that “this 
agreement is binding in honour only … and should not have 
any legal effects” may still bring the case to a court arguing for 
the existence of a contract and plea the court to enforce the 
agreement, but the court is very unlikely to enforce the agree- 
ment because of the parties’ manifest intention not to be legally 
bound. 
Therefore, even if we accept that the existence of considera- 
tion (the test of bargain) is sufficient to prove the parties serious 
intention, consideration is still insufficient to cover the essential 
function (let alone all the functions) of the intention to create 
legal relations test. A serious intention is unnecessarily an in- 
tention to be legally bound. 
Is Consideration Necessary for Contract Law or an  
Enforceable Contract? 
If the parties’ intention to be legally bound itself is required 
for an enforceable contract, in order to argue that consideration 
is necessary for an enforceable contract, it must be proved that 
consideration is necessary for the proving of such intention. 
Consideration is not necessary for the purpose of proving inten- 
tion to be legally bound. Consideration is even unnecessary for 
proving serious intention. There are many other ways to prove 
the parties’ serious intention and/or intention to be legally 
bound. It is undeniable that a deed may be legally enforceable 
even if there is no consideration. It is also undeniable that con- 
tract law in civil law systems functions well despite the lack of 
the concept of consideration. It is a mistaken brief that the con- 
cept of “cause” in continental contract law “equivalents” or 
“corresponds” to the common law concepts of “consideration” 
(Chloros, 1968: pp. 145-147). These suggest consideration is 
unnecessary for the enforcement of some agreements. It has 
been suggested that consideration is a substitute of formality, 
which also functions to indicate the parties’ serious intention. 
The key point is, therefore, enforceability of an agreement de- 
pends on whether the parties has by their statements or con- 
ducts shown their intention to be legally bound by the agree- 
ment. There are a number of methods to signify their serious 
intention or intention to be legally bound: inserting a clause that 
“this agreement is legally binding”, employing a lawyer in the 
negotiation and/or drafting, adopting a formality (a deed, a 
notary public, an oath or to put the agreement in writing and 
sign1), performance immediately following the agreement, and 
etc. A nominal consideration deliberately taken by the parties 
may be stronger evidence than a substantial consideration to 
prove intention to be legally bound. All of these suggest that it 
is the parties’ intention to be legally bound rather than the exis- 
tence of consideration that is paramount for the enforcement of 
an agreement or a promise and that consideration is not neces- 
1For example, the Judicature Act 1908 (NZ), s 92 provides that an acknowl-
edgement in writing and signed by a creditor of the receipt of a part of his 
debt in satisfaction of the whole debt shall be enforceable notwithstanding 
“any rule of law”. Here, the most relevant rule of law is that a (promise of)
part payment of an existing due debt in satisfaction of the whole debt is 
unenforceable because of the lack of consideration, established by the House 
of Lords in Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 605. 
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sary for proving such intention2. 
Whether the doctrine of consideration is necessary for con- 
tract law is a highly controversial issue. Because this paper has 
argued that consideration is insufficient to cover all the func- 
tions of the intention test, and such sufficiency is essential for 
the validity of the argument that the intention test should be 
abandoned due to the existence of the consideration test, it is 
unnecessary to answer this controversial issue. For the purpose 
of this paper, it is sufficient to say that the consideration may 
indicate serious intention to be bound somehow but unneces-
sary the intention to be legally bound. Notwithstanding this, the 
following paragraphs are still helpful to show that the necessity 
of consideration for contract law has been seriously doubted.  
Professor Coote points out that “the idea that consideration is 
essential to the very notion of a contract is a typical common 
law concept, but it is quite untrue” and “if it were true, common 
law countries would be the only ones which knew what a con- 
tract was” (Coote, 1995: p. 22). In fact, “[t]he civil law systems 
have been able to develop a perfectly adequate law of contract 
without consideration” (Chloros, 1968: p. 164). It has been ar- 
gued that consideration is “neither a necessary nor a central 
feature of contractual obligation” whether contractual oblige- 
tion is reliance-based or voluntary assumption based (Benson, 
2001: p. 121). If contractual liability is only one form of reli- 
ance-based promissory obligations, as what Atiyah (1986: pp. 
40-42) argues, then “consideration becomes evidence of reli- 
ance, nothing more” (Benson, 2001: p. 121). “It is the existence 
of reliance that is the crucial factor in establishing liability, 
whether or not consideration has been given” (ibid). If contrac- 
tual liability is to be understood not reliance-based, but as vol- 
untary or intentional assumption of promissory obligation, as 
what Fried (1981: pp. 28-39) and Coote (2010: pp. 7-51) argue, 
then such voluntary assumption “need not depend upon or be 
evidenced by the existence of consideration” (Benson, 2001: pp. 
121). 
Does the Consideration Test Work Better than the  
Intention Test? 
Simply saying that there is another test (the consideration test) 
of enforceability is not sufficient to prove that the intention test 
should be abandoned. It must also be proved that why this (in- 
tention) test, rather than that (consideration) test, should be 
abandoned. In this regard, this paper argues that the considera- 
tion test is very unlikely to work any better than the intention 
test and if one of these two tests must be abandoned it should 
be the consideration test rather than the intention test. Firstly, 
the doctrine of consideration suffers not less attacks by scholars 
than the intention test. It has been noted that all of the doctrines 
of offer and acceptance, consideration and intention to create 
legal relations suffer criticisms but the attacks on consideration 
are the most severe; and “it is unlikely that English law would 
adopt the doctrine of consideration were it to be given the op- 
portunity to start afresh” (McKendrick, 2003: p. 273). “Many 
have found” the doctrine of consideration confusing (Coote, 
1995: p. 22). Justifications claimed for the doctrine of consid- 
eration have been forcefully argued illusory and untenable (Koo, 
2011). 
Secondly, there have been official law reform proposals for 
abandoning the doctrine of consideration but there is none for 
abandoning the intention test. The United Kingdom Law Revi- 
sion Committee’s 1937 Report proposed a reform of some of 
the rules on consideration, such as writing as a substitute for 
consideration and moral obligation as good consideration 
(Chloros, 1968: p. 144). It is observed that “[I]n effect, the Re- 
port spelt the abolition of the doctrine through the back door” 
(ibid). Later in 1968, a paper commissioned by the United 
Kingdom Law Commission pointed out that the rest aspects of 
the doctrine of consideration “would have been modified by the 
Committee’s other proposals, e.g., the proposal to abolish the 
rule that past consideration is no consideration” and “[h]ad 
these proposals been put into effect they would have resulted in 
the virtual abolition of the doctrine of consideration although in 
theory English law would have still been governed by that doc- 
trine” (ibid). The 1968 paper, after detailed discussions, con- 
cluded that “English law would lose nothing if the doctrine of 
consideration were to be abolished” (ibid, p. 164). 
Finally but most importantly, some severe problems with the 
doctrine of consideration have been recognised, and the possi- 
bility of abolishing the doctrine has been seriously discussed 
and considered, by courts in some common law jurisdictions. 
For example, as Professor Coote noted, in re Selectmove Ltd 
[1995] 1 WLR 474, “a differently constituted [English] Court 
of Appeal … has found impossible to reconcile” the English 
Court of Appeal discussion in Williams v Roffey Bros & 
Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 5123 with the deci- 
sion of the House of Lords in Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App Cas 
605 (Coote, 1995: p. 22). Most notably, judges in the Singapore 
High Court and Court of Appeal, recently, in a number of case 
judgements, “openly questioned the utility of the doctrine [of 
consideration]” (Koo, 2011: p. 464). In Chwee Kin Keong v 
Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594, Rajah JC (as 
he then was) of the Singapore High Court in obitor, strongly 
doubted the necessity of consideration in commercial contracts 
and upheld the intention test. His honour stated (at para. [139]): 
The modern approach in contract law requires very little 
to find the existence of consideration. Indeed, in difficult 
cases, the courts in several common law jurisdictions have 
gone to extraordinary lengths to conjure up consideration. 
(See for example the approach in Williams v Roffey Bros 
& Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd. [1990] 1 All ER 512.) No 
modern authority was cited to me suggesting an intended 
commercial transaction of this nature could ever fail for 
want of consideration. Indeed, the time may have come 
for the common law to shed the pretence of searching for 
consideration to uphold commercial contracts. The mar- 
row of contractual relationships should be the parties’ in- 
tention to create a legal relationship [Emphasis original]. 
Another Judge, Phang J, in another Singapore High Court 
case of Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming 
Eric [2007] 1 SLR(R) 853, also in obitor, extended the judicial 
criticism of the consideration doctrine to non-commercial trans- 
actions. His honour suggested that “the doctrine of considera- 
2This can be illustrated by the United States Uniform Written Obligation Act 
(drafted by Williston and is adopted in Pennsylvania), s 1, which proposes: 
“A written release or promise hereafter made and signed by the person 
releasing or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of 
consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express statement, in 
any form of language, that the signer intends to be legally bound”. See 
Uniform Written Obligations Act, s 1, in Handbook of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 584 (1925), 
cited in Klass (2009: p. 1450). 
3In this case, the English Court of Appeal invented the concept of “practical 
benefit” to get around the consideration requirement in order to achieve a 
just outcome.
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tion may be outmoded even outside the context of purely com-
mercial transactions” (at para. [29]) because (at para. [30]):  
[T]he combined effect of Williams v Roffey Bros & Ni- 
cholls (Contractors) Ltd. … and the well-established pro- 
position that consideration must be sufficient but need not 
be adequate [make it] all too easy to locate some element 
of consideration between contracting parties. This would 
render requirement of consideration otiose or redundant, 
at least for the most part. 
Most recently in 2009, Phang JC (this time sitting as a Court 
of Appeal judge), in his judgement of the Singapore Court of 
Appeal case of Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie Terrence Peter 
[2009] 2 SLR(R) 332, continued his attacks on the doctrine of 
consideration. After the conclusion of the judgment, he added a 
lengthy (11 pages) critique entitled “A coda on the doctrine of 
consideration” (at para. [92-118]), which discussed the history 
and rationale of, and difficulty, with the doctrine, and suggested 
that doctrines of economic duress, undue influence and uncon- 
scionability are possible alternatives of the doctrine of consid- 
eration (at para. [113]). 
The above analysis shows that the problems with the doctrine 
of consideration have been recognised, and the possibility of 
abolishing the doctrine has been seriously considered and ar- 
gued for, not only by academics, but also by official law reform 
reports and judicial opinions in some common law jurisdictions. 
This is, however, not the case regarding the intention to create 
legal relations requirement. This shows that the doctrine of 
consideration is very unlikely to work any better than the inten- 
tion to create legal relation test. 
Some might argue that in the United States intention to create 
legal relations is not required for a contract, because Section 21 
of the Restatement (Second) of Contract provides that “[n]ei- 
ther real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally bind- 
ing is essential to the formation of a contract”. Such an argu- 
ment ignores the proviso of the Section 21 (Which provides 
“but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect 
legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract”), the 
Comments to the section4 and the fact that the Restatement is 
only “black-letter rules” which does “not necessarily describe 
judicial practice” in the United States (Klass, 2009: p. 1448). 
Section 21 of the Restatement in effect merely indicates en- 
forcement as a default with an opt-out rule and subject to ex- 
ceptions where the proof of intention is required (ibid). It can- 
not be said that intention to contract has been abolished from 
the contract law of the United States. This issue will be dis- 
cussed further in part III of this paper where the current posi- 
tion of the US law is analysed. Further, even some scholars 
who strongly argue for abandoning the intention requirement 
has noted that “US [.] and UK require the establishment of 
‘intention to create legal relations’ in addition to the existence 
of ‘consideration’” (Gulati, 2011: p. 127). 
A few scholars have noted that “[c]ase authorities in many 
common law jurisdictions show that both animus contrahendi 
and consideration are prerequisites to contract” (Cheshire and 
Fifoot, 1969: p. 189). It should also be noted that the “case 
authorities” referred to are limited to those before 1970, far 
before the notable cases demonstrating the confusion and diffi- 
culties of the doctrine of consideration, such as Williams v Rof- 
fey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd. [1990] 1 All ER 512, Re 
Selectmove Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 474, and the recent Singapore 
cases discussed above. Importantly, these suggestions, whether 
true or not, at least do not point in favour the argument that the 
consideration test works better than the intention test hence it is 
the intention test rather than the consideration should be exiled 
from common law. 
In summary, consideration is neither sufficient nor necessary 
in proving intention to create legal relations. The doctrine of 
consideration is under fierce attacks, both by academics and 
judicial opinions, and it is very unlikely to work any better than 
intention to create legal relations as a test of enforceability of 
agreements. 
“Intention to Create Legal Relations” and “Offer and  
Acceptance” 
It is also argued that intention to be legally bound “is already 
necessary” for the finding of offer and acceptance and to over- 
come any uncertainty, “each of which is already a constituent 
of an enforceable contract” so “intention to create legal rela- 
tions as an additional requirement is superfluous” (Chen-Wish- 
art, 2009: p. 444).  
If this argument were correct, it would equally apply to con- 
sideration and would also make consideration redundant. If 
intention to be legally bound is already proved by the finding of 
“offer and acceptance” and “certainty”, which are “already 
constituent[s] of an enforceable contract” (ibid, emphasis add- 
ed), anything else including consideration would be superfluous, 
as the most often and seemingly strongest argument for aban- 
doning the (proof of) intention requirement is “the considera- 
tion itself can be taken as a proof strong enough to indicate the 
presence of intention of forming a legally binding contract” 
(Gulati, 2011: p. 132). An absurd outcome would logically flow 
from the abandonists’ argument, that is, so long as there are 
offer and acceptance and certainty, there will be an enforceable 
contract. A further nightmare for consideration will also natu- 
rally flow from this argument, that is, as Benson (2001: pp. 
149-155) pointed out, an offer necessarily contains a promise 
by the offeror and the offeree’s acceptance must also contain a 
promise in exchange for the offeror’s promise. In that way, 
offeror’s promise in exchange for offeree’s promise (considera- 
tion) “is already necessary” for the finding of offer and accep- 
tance and overcome any uncertainty, and “each of which is 
already a constituent of an enforceable contract” (Chen-Wishart, 
2009: p. 444), hence a separate test of consideration is unnec- 
essary. 
A more appropriate view is that offer and acceptance (with 
certainty) alone is not enough for the formation of an enforce- 
able contract. Offer and acceptance must be supplemented by 
other doctrines. Offer and acceptance (with certainty) focus on 
the phenomenon of consensus ad idem. Offer is an expression 
of the offor’s willingness to be bound by the terms of the offer, 
but unnecessary with the intention to be legally bound. A con-
tract can be deconstructed into three levels. First, offer and 
acceptance concludes an agreement, but whether the agreement 
is legally binding is another issue. Second, if the agreement is 
supported by consideration, the agreement is binding somehow 
but unnecessarily legally. Third, if there is intention to create 
legal relations, the agreement is legally binding and thus a con- 
4Restatement (Second) of Contracts s 21 cmt c (1981) provides that “[i] n 
some situations the normal understanding is that no legal obligation arises, 
and some unusual manifestation of intention is necessary to create a con-
tract. Traditional examples are social engagements and agreements within a 
family group”. 
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tract.  
Therefore, it is the intention to be bound somehow rather 
than the intention to be legally bound is “is already necessary” 
for the finding of offer and acceptance and to overcome any 
uncertainty. In this sense, the above problems raised are even 
more troublesome for consideration, because offer and accep- 
tance have already required the parties’ intention to be bound 
somehow by the promises made in exchange for each another. 
They are exactly what consideration functions in that the exis- 
tence of consideration also indicates the parties’ intention to be 
bound somehow. If something is superfluous for the formation 
of an enforceable contract that must be consideration rather 
than the intention to create legal relations.  
It might also be argued that the seriousness of the parties’ in- 
tention is already required for the finding of offer and accep- 
tance, because an offer (acceptance) not seriously made is sim- 
ply not an offer (acceptance) at all. This is true but similar to 
what this paper argues above in part II A, in making effective 
offer or acceptance, the offeror and offeree must show their 
seriousness about undertaking some kind of obligations, but 
unnecessarily seriousness about undertaking legal obligations. 
If an “offer” was not seriously made, the maker “did not ex- 
press an intention to create any relations, legal or otherwise” 
(Smith, 2005: p. 37, emphasis original). Merely serious inten- 
tion to be bound is not enough for a legally enforceable contract, 
there must be serious intention to be legally bound. Again, if 
something must be abandoned, that will be consideration rather 
than the intention to create legal relations, because considera-
tion only indicates the parties serious intention (not necessarily 
legal intention) and such seriousness “is already necessary” for 
the finding of offer and acceptance and to overcome any uncer- 
tainty, “each of which is already a constituent of an enforceable 
contract” (Chen-Wishart, 2009: p. 444). 
The Domestic/Commercial Distinction 
Another way of arguing for abandoning the requirement of 
(proving) of the intention to create legal relations is to attack 
the two rebuttable presumptions based on the distinction be- 
tween domestic/social and commercial agreements: “that com- 
mercial agreements are prima facie enforceable and social and 
domestic agreements are not” (ibid). Three sorts of arguments 
were put forth in support the suggestion that presumptions 
based the domestic/commercial agreements distinction “are no 
longer reasonable and justifiable” (Gulati, 2011: p. 129).  
Despite the attacks on the distinction between domestic/so- 
cial and commercial agreements, the courts in most common 
law jurisdiction still treat them differently. Pure domestic 
agreements are classic examples of non-commercial agreements. 
Other non-commercial agreements may include “appointment” 
agreements between a church and a priest (as that in Ermoge- 
nous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc [2002] HCA 8), a 
collective agreement between a labour union and an employer 
(as that in Ford Motor Co Ltd v Amalgamated Union of Engi- 
neering and Foundry Worker [1969] 1 WLR 339). Courts very 
often treat them by referring to domestic/social agreements. For 
the convenience of analysis, this paper uses domestic agree- 
ments as an illustration of how non-commercial agreements are 
and should be treated. 
The Changing Appearance versus Nature of  
Domestic/Social Relations 
It is argue that due to “the changing nature of domestic/so- 
cial relations”, “the dividing line between the domestic and 
commercial contracts is shrinking”, so the presumptions based 
on the domestic/commercial agreements distinction “is no 
longer reasonable and justifiable” (Gulati, 2011: p. 129). Criti- 
cisms can be made on this argument. First, this argument mixes 
up the appearance of domestic/social relations with the nature 
of such relations. It must be noted that the nature of domestic/ 
social relations has not substantially changed notwithstanding 
that the appearance of such relations seems to have changed. 
“[H]igh divorce rates” and “more precise statements about a 
couple’s obligations” (ibid) do not mean nowadays the nature 
of the relation between husband and wife is not dissimilar to a 
commercial relation. Who is able to forcefully argue that today 
the nature of domestic relations is basically commercial? Even 
if there are some “commercial factors” in the domestic relations, 
it is undeniable that “love, honour and cherish” are still the 
nature of familial relations. In commercial settings, agreements 
are generally results of “at-arms-length bargaining” whereas in 
domestic settings it is very much more likely (than in comer- 
cial settings) that agreements are results of generosity/good 
will/care/passion and love. “Family agreements differ categori- 
cally from arms-length commercial contracts” (Trebilcock & 
Elliott, 2001: p. 53). Had the nature of familial relations sub- 
stantially changed and become not dissimilar to commercial 
relations, family as the basic structure of our society would 
have disappeared. 
It might be true that husbands and wives “often have diver- 
gent interests” (ibid, p. 60), but this does not mean the basic 
nature of the relation between husbands and wives are substan- 
tially the same with commercial relations between strangers or 
business partners. “Whereas commercial actors can be assumed 
[…] to be actuated by self-oriented motives, family members 
cannot be” (ibid, p. 53). “Family financial arrangements should 
not […] be thought of as bargains in the strict sense” (ibid). 
When courts apply generic contract law principles/rules on 
agreements between husbands and wives, such divergent inter- 
ests might “not always be appreciated” (ibid, p. 60, emphasis 
added), but principles/rules of other areas of law (such as fam- 
ily law) may step in to fill the gap where such divergent inter- 
ests should be appreciated to achieve just and fairness. That fact 
that legislation requires much more stringent formality for cer- 
tain agreements between husbands and wives to be legally en- 
forceable5 demonstrates the special nature of familial relations 
and that there are substantial differences between domestic and 
commercial arrangements. Such legislation also reflects the fact 
that close relationships may often affect the parties’ judgments 
as to the nature, value and terms of the agreements hence courts 
should be more cautious about enforcement of agreements be- 
tween parties with domestic/social relations. 
Second, the abandonists’ argument mixes up domestic agree- 
ments with domestic contracts. “The dividing line between the 
domestic and commercial contracts is shrinking” (Gulati, 2011: 
p. 129, emphasis added) does not mean the distinction between 
5This can be illustrated by the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (New 
Zealand), section 21, which provides that for an agreement dealing with 
relational property between a couple (whether married, civil union or de 
facto partners) to be legally enforceable, such agreement must be in writing, 
signed by each party in the presence of a lawyer who must certify that inde-
pendent legal advice has been given regarding the implications and effects 
of the agreement. Similarly in Australia, the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 
sections 90B-90G set out stringent requirements for the enforcement of 
financial agreement between spouses, including the agreement being in 
writing, signed, independent legal advice, etc. 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. 86 
Z. LIAO 
domestic and commercial agreements or arrangements no 
longer exists. For contracts, whether domestic or commercial, 
the distinction should be very limited. However, a large amount 
of domestic/social agreements or arrangements are not con-
tracts, the distinction between domestic/social and commercial 
agreements are still substantial. Further, assuming what is ar-
gued were the “dividing line between the domestic and com-
mercial agreement is shrinking”, such an argument would still 
fail to spell out to what extent “the dividing line” must be 
“shrinking” in order to justify treating domestic/social agree-
ments the same way as commercial agreements. 
Third, most importantly, this abandonists’ argument ignores 
the fact that the distinction of the underlying values promoted 
by the different categories of arrangements remains unchanged. 
The fundamental distinction between domestic/social and com- 
mercial arrangements still exists for the purpose of contract law. 
Generally, domestic/social arrangements “are not bargains in 
the ordinary sense of the term” and parties enter into domes- 
tic/social agreements mainly for the purpose of promotion of 
the parties “shared interest” [emphasis original] whereas com- 
mercial agreements are generally bargains whereby the parties 
pursue personal advantages, that is, self-interest of a party 
(Smith, 2004: p. 214). The shared interest “lies both in the sub- 
ject matter of the agreement (children, housework, etc.) and in 
the goal of strengthening the relationship itself” (ibid). The law 
should uphold rather than undermine the distinctive “shared- 
interest” value of families and/or other close social relations. 
The proper way of upholding is non-interference, that is, to 
leave domestic/social arrangements in the hands of the parties, 
because “the mere threat of legal enforcement can change the 
character, and hence the value, of domestic agreements” (ibid). 
This may be an important justification for the non-enforcement 
default of domestic/social agreement. 
Relational Contract and Behavioural Decision Theories 
It is argued that the application of behavioural decision the- 
ory “undermines the distinction between family and comercial 
arrangements” (Keyes & Burns, 2002: p. 588) and that rela- 
tional theory “suggests that the similarities between the two 
categories may outweigh the differences” (ibid, p. 586), hence, 
family agreements should be presumed to be enforceable as 
commercial ones (ibid).  
Relation contract theory argues that the majority of contrac- 
tual arrangements are relational contracts, the parties to which 
value and endeavour to preserve relations and uphold social 
norms rather than simply attempt to maximise wealth or effi- 
ciency (Seddon & Ellinghaus, 1997: pp. 894-896). The parties 
value incompleteness and the flexibility coming from income- 
pleteness (Heffey, Paterson, & Robertson, 2002: p. 27). They 
“seek to preserve their business relationships where possible, 
rather than to enforce their contractual rights” (keyes & Burns, 
2002: p. 586). Therefore, it is argued, that “when commercial 
contractual relationships are viewed in this way, there is little 
justification for the distinction between family and commercial 
arrangements…” (ibid). 
This argument is not without problems. First, relational con- 
tract theory has its drawbacks. Not all commercial relations are 
long term and on-going relations and many contracts are en- 
tered into for one-shot transactions only. Furthermore, it would 
be incorrect to treat all relational contracts as one category, and 
contracts can be relational in various senses and to various de- 
grees (Heffey, Paterson, & Robertson, 2002: p. 28). Some busi- 
nesses, such as franchising, joint venture, and the supply chain 
of processing materials may be relational; whereas others such 
as the commercial banking industry may be less relational 
(ibid). 
Second, even if all or most commercial contract were rela- 
tional, there would still be substantial difference of the under- 
lying values between commercial relational contracts and fa- 
milial agreements. Parties to commercial relational contracts 
may put down the short-term self-interest temporarily in order 
to preserve the longer business relationships, but the rival 
self-interest of each party still exists for a long run. It is uni- 
maginable that commercial parties value the relations to such 
an extent that they ignore both the short-term and long-term 
self-interest. Business organisations may uphold or be required 
to follow social norms, but this does not mean the pursuing of 
profit (including long-term business gains or business advan- 
tages) is no longer an important objective of business organisa- 
tions. The basic function and objective of commercial relations, 
no matter how relational they may be, is still substantially dif- 
ferent from those of domestic/social relations. Commercial 
contracts, including the relational ones, are still a basic mecha- 
nism for the parties’ to deal with each another at arm’s length, 
whereas domestic/social agreements are not. 
Third, the meaning and effect of “incompleteness”, a striking 
feature of relational contracts, are different for relational com- 
mercial contracts and domestic/social agreements. For com- 
mercial agreements, the gaps as a result of the “incomplete- 
ness” can be filled, for “business efficacy”, by implied terms 
developed based on commercial practices in a particular market 
sector, the context of “a contractual community” (Wightman, 
2000: p. 106), so the “incompleteness” may not be a real one in 
many circumstances. For domestic/social agreements, however, 
“the parties are not participating in practices which share a set 
of norms which commonly apply to a category of situations” 
(ibid, p. 107), no “sector wide” practices can be adopted to fill 
the gaps, so the “incompleteness” in domestic/social agree- 
ments are much more substantial and real. 
Behavioural decision theory (BDT) “suggests that human 
beings, whether involved in family or commercial arrangements, 
are affected by numerous irrational decision-making processes. 
These may affect the ability to make a rational choice at the 
outset about whether an arrangement should be contractually 
binding” (Keyes & Burns, 2002: p. 588). It is therefore argued 
that the application of behavioural decision theory “undermines 
the distinction between family and commercial arrangements” 
(ibid). 
Three points can be made about this argument. First, the 
theoretical validity of BDT remains to be seen. Posner com- 
prehensively criticised BDT’s attacks on rational choice theory 
(Posner, 1998). Second, even if BDT itself is theoretically ten- 
able, it may not be appropriate to apply in analysing legal issues. 
Many scholars have argued that the BDT, primarily based on 
cognitive and social phycology, is not appropriate to apply in 
analysing legal issues (Hillman, 2000; Rostain, 2000). Third, 
even if BDT could be apply in analysing legal issues BDT 
would not necessarily “undermines the distinction between 
family and commercial arrangements” (Keyes & Burns, 2002, p. 
588) to such an extent that substantially vitiates the distinction. 
If “rationality” means self-interested, wealth-maximising as an 
“economic person” is presumed to pursue, in domestic ar-
rangement settings, the parties are much more likely to be “irra-
tional” in decision making than parties in commercial tran- 
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sactions. Close relations between the parties inevitably influ- 
ence their cognitive and psychological aspects which impair the 
ability/mood/environment for a rational decision making. The 
closer the relations between the parties are, the more likely the 
parties may make “irrational” decisions and the more severe the 
“irrationality” may be. Even if both family members in domes-
tic agreements and parties in commercial transactions are “irra-
tional”, their degrees of “irrationality” could still be so substan-
tially different that it is inappropriate for contract law to treat 
the two categories of agreements in a same way.  
Difficulty of Distinguishing Domestic/Social from  
Commercial Agreements 
It is argued that determining the category of the agreement in 
issue is a prerequisite for the courts to choose an appropriate 
presumption of the parties’ intention, but it could be extremely 
difficult to determine whether a particular agreement is a do- 
mestic/social one or a commercial one in certain circumstances, 
especially, where the two types of relations are intermingled, 
such as a family business (Gulati, 2011).  
Admittedly, in practice it could be very difficult to distin- 
guish domestic/social relations from commercial settings in 
certain circumstances, especially, in “intermingle” cases. In this 
regard, courts have developed rules/principles that are helpful 
in dealing with borderline or intermingled cases. For example, a 
business agreement between family members would be treated 
as a commercial agreement and the intention to be legally 
bound is thus presumed; or if it is treated as a domestic agree- 
ment the “no intention” presumption will be rebutted by the 
commercial aspects (as in Roufos v Brewster (1971) 2 SASR 
218). “An ordinary commercial contract or contract of em- 
ployment is not rendered unenforceable by the mere fact that 
the parties happen to be closely related” (Lucke, 1967-1970, p. 
424). The “no intention” presumption does not apply to es- 
tranged couples, or the presumption is rebutted by the fact of 
the estrangement (Merritt v Merritt [1970] 1 WLR 1211). Over 
time, courts have identified factors pointing in favour or against 
the finding of intention to be legally bound6, which could also 
be helpful in determining the nature of the relationships and the 
application and rebuttal of the presumptions. 
Most importantly, the practical difficulty does not negate the 
clear distinction of different values promoted by the different 
types of agreements. Practical difficulty does not justify treat- 
ing the same way the two types of agreements which are sub- 
stantially different in nature. Such practical difficulty is not 
unique to contract law. Many other areas of law have similar 
practical difficulties, which may be even worse than the distin- 
guishing domestic/commercial relations. For example, in tax 
law, it could be extremely difficult to determine whether a par- 
ticular sum spent/received is revenue or capital in nature, or 
whether a tax payer’s conducts amounts to tax avoidance or 
merely tax mitigation. The difficulty does not result in courts 
treating revenue and capital, tax avoidance and tax mitigation in 
the same way. This is because revenue and capital, tax avoid- 
ance and tax mitigation are completely different in nature 
which justifies courts to treat them completely differently, de- 
spite the practical difficulty. 
In summary, although the society has been changed over the 
90 more years after the judgment of Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 
KB 571, the fundamental distinction, that is, the different val- 
ues promoted by domestic/social and commercial arranges, 
remains unchanged. Neither relational contract theories and 
behavioural decision theory, nor practical difficulty in distin- 
guishing domestic arrangements form commercial arrange- 
ments negates the underlying value and nature distinction be- 
tween domestic and commercial arrangements. Such a distinc- 
tion still exists and will continue to exist no matter how the 
society develops and changes so long as the nature and value of 
domestic and other close relations based on love, passion, af- 
fection, trust or other moral or social norms are still appreciated 
by human beings. It is another issue whether courts should 
continue to adopt different evidentiary presumptions for prov- 
ing intentions to create legal relations in different settings. This 
will be discussed in the law reform part of this paper. 
It should also be noted that even if it were successfully ar- 
gued that the presumptions based on the domestic/commercial 
distinction should be abandoned, the displacement of the pre- 
sumption would still not mean the proving of the intention to 
create legal relations should not be a requirement for the forma- 
tion of an enforceable contract. The requirement of proving is 
one thing, whether applying presumptions in the proving proc- 
ess is another thing. 
“Legal Fiction”, “Difficult to Prove” and  
“Manipulation” 
It is argued that “the orthodox language of intention appears 
to be based on a legal fiction, in that few (if any) parties turn 
their minds at the time of forming such agreements to the ques- 
tion of whether legal rights are being created” (Poole, 2006: p. 
189). Since intention is a subjective state of mind, which is 
“notoriously difficult to prove”, “there is often no objective 
evidence which may be produced as conclusive proof” (ibid, p. 
186). Therefore, courts may manipulate the intention test (or 
the presumptions) for “the appropriateness of enforcement in 
the particular contexts” (Chen-Wishart, 2009: p. 444). 
The problems raised above are related not only to the proving 
of intention to create legal relations, but also to the intention 
itself; and some problems are related to any kinds of intention. 
Unless the concept of intention (not limited to contractual in- 
tention) is excluded from contract law, these problems will 
remain. It has been noted, however, that “the courts and the 
writers are unanimous that proof of serious intention is re- 
quired” (Chloros, 1968: p. 140, emphasis added). There is a 
dilemma for those who argue for abandoning the intention test: 
if they accept that serious intention is unnecessarily legal inten- 
tion, this paper thanks them for backing up the argument that 
consideration, offer and acceptance may indicate serious inten- 
tion but unnecessarily legal intention; but if they argue that 
serious intention means intention to create legal relations, then 
any attacks on the intention to create legal relations requirement, 
including the “legal fiction”, “difficult to prove” and “manipu- 
lation”, will be attacks on their own arguments. It seems that 
they do not mean that serious intention or intention to be legally 
bound is unnecessary but that the proving of such intention is 
redundant because “the consideration itself can be taken as a 
proof strong enough to indicate the presence of intention of 
forming a legally binding contract” (Gulati, 2011: p. 132). The 
difference between arguments for and against the intention test 
is not whether the intention itself is required, but whether a 
separate intention test is necessary additional to the considera- 
tion test for enforceability. Therefore, the arguments that con- 
6For case authorities and discussions on this, see Lucke (1967-1970: pp. 
421-422). 
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sideration, offer and acceptance should be taken as evidence 
strong enough to prove the intention to be legally bound is 
based on the same ground that such intention itself is still re- 
quired. Consequently, a difficulty for one argument is equally a 
difficulty for the opposite. So long as the notion of “serious 
intention” is still relied upon by contract law for the purpose of 
distinguishing contracts from unenforceable agreements, the 
above raised problems with intention will go with arguments 
for both sides.  
Particularly, as to the difficulty of proving intention and the 
intention objectively proved may be different from what the 
parties actually intended, the proving of consideration has the 
same difficulty, because “promises can only be made intention- 
ally” and the search for intention is necessarily subjective 
(Smith, 2004: p. 174). As an offer is an expression of the of- 
feror’s intention to be bound by the terms of the offer, the exis- 
tence of an offer hinges on the intention, which is again subject- 
tive. This problem goes to the fundamental objective theory of 
contract. It is settled law that intention can only be inferred 
from objective facts. In determining the parties’ intention, 
courts look at the statements and conducts of the parties rather 
than their internal state of mind. Interestingly, having said that 
“there is often no objective evidence which may be produced as 
conclusive proof” (Poole, 2006: p. 186), how can abandonists 
argue that “the consideration itself can be taken as a proof 
strong enough to indicate the presence of intention of forming a 
legally binding contract” (Gulati, 2011: p. 132, emphasis add- 
ed)? Is consideration an exception or not objective evidence at 
all? 
Similarly, the manipulation concern is not unique to the in- 
tention test. Even if the intention requirement is abolished, 
there is still the concern that courts may manipulate the doctrine 
of consideration or other contractual requirements to achieve 
“the appropriateness of enforcement in the particular contexts” 
(Chen-Wishart, 2009: p. 444). The invention of “practical bene- 
fit”, in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd 
[1990] 1 All ER 512, as consideration is a good illustration of 
such possible manipulations. The manipulation concern will not 
be alleviated by abandoning the intention requirement. Any 
judicial discretion could be a risk of judicial manipulation. 
Flexibility is inevitably at the price of certainty, but the exces-
sive pursuit of certainty may result in rigidity. Manipulation 
can be minimized by a set of consistent principles and the doc-
trine of precedents. In this sense, keeping the two rebuttable 
presumptions of intention base on domestic/social and com-
mercial distinction may be a good way to balance the compet-
ing needs of flexibility and certainty. 
Comparison of Current Positions in Common 
Law Jurisdictions 
Current Positions in Some Common Law  
Jurisdictions 
The current positions in the United States, United Kingdom 
(England), and Australia/New Zealand represent three catego- 
ries of positions adopted by common law jurisdictions con- 
cerning the requirement of intention to create legal relations 
and the related evidentiary rules. Arguably, any of the other 
common law jurisdictions currently adopts one of these three 
positions. It is therefore helpful to have a comparison of them 
before law reform proposals are made. 
In the United States, section 21 of the Second Restatement of 
Contracts provides that “Neither real nor apparent intention that 
a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a 
contract, but a manifestation of intention that a promise shall 
not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a con- 
tract”. The comments to Section 21, however, provide that “[i]n 
some situations the normal understanding is that no legal obli- 
gation arises, and some unusual manifestation of intention is 
necessary to create a contract. Traditional examples are social 
engagements and agreements within a family group” (Restate- 
ment (Second) of Contracts, s 21 cmt c (1981)). This means 
that the United States contract law has not abandoned the no- 
tion of intention to create legal relations but merely adopted 
enforcement as a default with exceptions of non-enforcement. 
One exception is where the parties’ intention not to be legally 
bound is manifested (the second clause of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, s 21). Another is that “[i]n some situa- 
tions” (including situations where domestic or social agree- 
ments are involved) intention to create legal relations “is nec- 
essary to create a contract” (Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
s 21 cmt c (1981)). 
The orthodox and current position of English law is that in- 
tention to create legal relations is necessary, additional to con- 
sideration, offer and acceptance, for the formation of a legally 
enforceable contract (This is confirmed in Baird Textile Hold- 
ings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274 at 
[59]). There are also two established rebuttable presumptions. 
One is that commercial agreements are presumed to be legally 
binding unless courts are satisfied by strong evidence to the 
contrary (Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] WLR 349; O’Keefe v 
Ryannair Holdings plc [2002] IEHC 154). The other is domes- 
tic/social agreements are presumed not to be legally binding 
unless proved otherwise by evidence to the contrary (Balfour v 
Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571; Jones v Padavatton [1969] 2 All ER 
616). 
Traditionally, Australian and New Zealand law took the 
same position as that in English law but this has been changed 
by judicial actions. Currently in both Australian and New Zea- 
land law, intention to create legal relations is required and the 
party alleging the existence of the contract is to prove the exis- 
tence of the intention. The two rebuttable presumptions based 
on the domestic/commercial distinction have been doubted by 
the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Fleeming v Beevers 
[1994] 1 NZLR 385, and by the High Court of Australia in 
Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc [2002] 
HCA 8. It is suggested that the effect of these case judgements 
is that the presumptions of intention (or no intention) to be 
legally bound are no longer relied upon in any context (Burrow, 
Finn & Todd, 2012: p. 172; Courmadias, 2006: pp. 175-185). 
As the intention to create legal relations is still required for an 
enforceable contract and the presumptions are no longer relied 
upon, the general rule of evidence concerning the burden of 
proof applies, which means an agreement will not be enforce- 
able unless the party alleging the existence of a contract proves 
the intention to create legal relations. 
Comparison of the Current Positions 
It has been observed that concerning enforceability of con- 
tracts and intention to create legal relations the real difference 
between English law and US law is not as what the “black let- 
ter” rules indicate (Klass, 2009: pp. 1438-1439). The actual 
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situation is that courts in both jurisdictions presume, in practice, 
that commercial agreements are enforceable and domestic 
agreements are not. In the United States, the law provides in- 
tention to be legally bound is generally not required and com- 
mercial agreements are enforceable as a default, unless there is 
manifest intention of the parties not to be legally bound (Re- 
statement (Second) of Contract, s 21). English law says that 
intention to create legal relations is required, but courts pre- 
sume the existence of such intention unless satisfied by strong 
evidence to the contrary (Edwards v Skyways [1964] 1 WLR 
349; Rose and Frank Co v J R Crompton & Bros Ltd [1932] 2 
KB 261). The effect is that commercial agreements are en- 
forceable as a default. Therefore, although there seems to be a 
huge difference between the “black letter” law of United States 
(which says intention to be legally bound is not required) and 
that in England (which says intention to be legally bound is 
required, as stated in Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & 
Spencer plc [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274 at [59]), the real practice 
is that commercial agreements in both jurisdictions are en- 
forceable as default. The minor difference is that in the United 
States, an otherwise enforceable commercial agreement will not 
be enforced only if the parties manifest (express) their intention 
not to be legally bound (Klass, 2009: pp. 1468-1469), whereas 
in England, an otherwise enforceable commercial agreement 
will not be enforced if there is strong evidence (very often but 
unnecessarily being express statements of the parties) of the 
parties’ intention not to be legally bound (Edwards v Skyways 
Ltd [1964] WLR 349). Despite this difference, the English law, 
by adoption of the strong presumption and other evidentiary 
rules (such as reading ambiguous expression of intent against 
the defendant, holding one-sided or partial performance of the 
agreement negates an unambiguous statement that it is not in- 
tended as a contract), “produces the same outcome” as the 
United States law would “in most commercial cases” (Klass, 
2009: p. 1459). 
As to non-commercial agreements, especially domestic/so- 
cial agreements, the United States’ law and the English law, 
regarding intention to contract, are even more similar. Intention 
to create legal relations is required for domestic and social 
agreements to be enforceable in both jurisdictions. In the 
United States, “the normal understanding is that no legal obli- 
gation arises, and some unusual manifestation of intention is 
necessary to create a contract” (Restatement (Second) of Con- 
tracts, 21 cmt c (1981)). Here, “the normal understanding” cor- 
responds to the English law presumption that domestic/social 
agreements are prima facie unenforceable, and the “manifesta- 
tion of intention is necessary to create a contract” corresponds 
to the English rule that the non-enforcement presumption can 
be rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 
Both English law and the law in Australia/New Zealand re- 
quire intention to create legal relations for the formation of an 
enforceable contract, but the English law adopts the two evi- 
dentiary presumptions whereas the law in Australia/New Zea-
land seems have abandoned such presumptions. The effect of 
abandoning the presumptions is that intention to create legal 
relations as a contractual requirement is to be proved by the 
party arguing for enforcement of the agreement in issue, 
whether it is a commercial agreement or not. For domestic/ 
social agreements, this does not, in practice, change the non- 
enforcement default, in that whether the presumption is adopted 
or not, such agreements are prima facie unenforceable unless 
intention to create legal relations is proved. For commercial 
agreements, the difference seems to be more obvious, at least 
when the “black letter” rules are concerned. As English law 
adopts the strong presumption that parties to commercial 
agreements are intended to be legally bound, commercial 
agreements are prima facie enforceable. Positive proof of the 
intention to be legally bound is not required. Whereas in Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand, without the presumption, the applica- 
tion of general rules on burden of proof is that positive proof of 
such intention is required for commercial agreement to be en- 
forceable. 
In practice, however, under English law, because the pre- 
sumptions of intention are rebuttable by evidence to the con- 
trary, the parties will try their best to produce evidence to rebut 
or to reinforce the presumptions, which to a large extent results 
in the English approach closer to the all-things-considered ap- 
proach taken by Australia/New Zealand. The key difference lies 
in that the presumptions only shift the onus of proof in cases 
where commercial agreements are involved. The effect is that 
for most commercial cases, the outcome would be the same. 
Only in (commercial) borderline cases, where neither the plain- 
tiff nor the defendant can prove the parties’ intention to be 
bound or otherwise, the outcome will be different: under the 
English law there will be a contract by virtue of the presump- 
tion, whereas under the Australia/New Zealand law there will 
not. 
To sum up, commercial agreements are prima facie enforce- 
able under current English law and the United States’ law, 
whereas they are not under the current Australian/New Zealand 
law. Partially based on Klass’s observation (Klass, 2009: p. 
1468), the current positions of law in these common law juris- 
dictions regarding the requirement of intention to create legal 
relations can be summarized as a table below (Table 1), which 
may be oversimplified, but still be helpful in the discussion of 
possible law reform options. 
Notably, in all these jurisdictions, the practical effect is that 
domestic/social agreements are presumed unenforceable as a 
default. It should also be noted that consideration is still re- 
quired for an enforceable contract in all of these jurisdictions, 
which means that the intention to create legal relations, where 
required (such as the situations where domestic/social agree-
ments are involved), is a separate requirement additional to the 
consideration requirement for an enforceable contract. 
Contract Law Reform: A Conservative  
Approach in the Modern Global Era 
Gulati (2011) proposes to abandon the intention to create le- 
gal relations requirement in common law jurisdictions where 
consideration is required for an enforceable contract, but to 
keep the intention requirement in jurisdictions where considera- 
tion is not required (e.g. in civil law jurisdictions). This paper 
argues that this may not be a good law reform option. First, this 
proposal is based on the argument that the existence of consid- 
eration is sufficient to prove intention to create legal relations. 
As this paper argues in Part II A, consideration is neither nec- 
essary nor sufficient for the proving of intention to create legal 
relations.  
Second, Gulati’s proposal is contrary to the trend of global- 
isation and the goals of harmonisation and unification of con- 
tract law. Contract law concerns about transactions and in such 
a globalisation era transactions go easily beyond the border of a 
particular jurisdiction. Surely contract law differences may be  
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Table 1. 
Comparison of current positions of US, UK and Australia/New Zealand. 
Jurisdiction Commercial agreements Non-commercial agreements 
US Enforceable unless intention not to be legally bound manifested Unenforceable unless intention to be bound proved 
UK (England) Enforceable unless intention not to be legally bound strongly proved Unenforceable unless intention to be bound proved 
Australia & New Zealand Unenforceable unless intention to be legally bound proved Unenforceable unless intention to be bound proved 
 
deal with by private international law rules especially by the 
parties’ choice of the governing law of the contract, but the 
efficiency and consistency from the unification of contract law 
is still very attractive. Therefore, unification rather than di- 
versification should be an important objective of contract law 
reform. Intention to create legal relations requirement is a 
common feature of civil-law systems (see, e.g. The Principles 
of European Contract Law, art 2:101), whereas consideration is 
not7. 
The Australia/New Zealand approach (with the intention re- 
quirement but the presumptions displaced) is not a satisfactory 
law reform choice. First, it has not substantially changed the 
non-enforcement default status of domestic/social agreements, 
in that intention to be legally bound is still required to be posi- 
tively proved in order for the agreements to be enforceable. For 
this reason, enforcement of domestic agreements has not been 
made easier, as feminists and/or advocates of gay/lesbian’s 
rights argue for8. The result of dumping the presumptions is not 
an enforcement default of domestic agreement but a non-en- 
forcement default of commercial agreements. The feminists’ 
argument that domestic agreements should not be treated dis- 
criminately from commercial agreements is uphold, but their 
proposal to make domestic agreement generally enforceable 
without the need of proving intention to create legal relations 
failed (in order to achieve this goal, merely abandoning the 
presumptions is not enough but feminists must prove that the 
intention to create legal relations should not be a requirement 
for any enforceable agreement whether a domestic agreement 
or not). The net effect of merely dumping the presumptions is 
that a) less certainty of enforceability of commercial agreement, 
b) a higher cost incurred in proving intention for the enforce- 
ment of commercial agreements. 
Third, abandoning the intention to create legal relation will 
not increase any certainty and/or consistency of contract law, 
but increase the rigidity. As his paper has argued in Part II, the 
consideration test is unlikely to work any better than the inten- 
tion test. Consideration is also subject to the manipulation con- 
cern. The uncertainty and inconsistency related to the doctrine 
of consideration has been illustrated by the difficulty of recon- 
ciling the judgments in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Con- 
tractors) Lt [1990] 1 All ER 512 and Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 
App Cas 605, and the intrusion of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. On the other hand, abandoning the intention test will 
inevitable bring in a rigidity problem, that is, so long as an 
agreement is supported by consideration, it is enforceable, 
whether the parties intended to be legally bound or not. Such 
rigidity ignores that as a matter of fact, there are many agree- 
ments that are supported by consideration but the parties do not 
intended to be legally bound by them. 
A better option of contract law reform concerning the inten- 
tion to create legal relations requirement is for all the common 
law jurisdictions to adopt (or go back to) the orthodox (which is 
also the current) English law position, that is, to keep both the 
intention to create legal relations requirements, and the two 
presumptions and the related evidentiary rules. Such a mecha- 
nism balances the need of flexibility and certainty. Flexibility 
can be achieved by the development of the categories that the 
domestic/social presumption is applicable, by carving out spe- 
cial agreements from the enforcement default), and courts’ 
discretion in accepting and weighing of evidence to rebut or 
reinforce the presumptions. The presumptions provide for cer- 
tainty to some extent, in that at least it is well-known that 
commercial agreements are prima facie enforceable whereas 
domestic/social agreements are not. This is better than the all- 
things-considered approach without the presumptions, as the 
current position of Australia/New Zealand law, which results in 
less certainty. As the above analytical comparison shows, such 
a conservative “reform” will not cause substantial changes to 
the United States’ law, as regarding the intention requirement 
the practical effect of the current United State law is very simi- 
lar to the current English law. Nor will this “reform” cause 
significant difficulties for Australia/New Zealand law as their 
legal positions were just changed recently, and for most cases, 
whether commercial or domestic/social, the outcome would not 
be different, whether the rebuttable presumptions or all-things- 
considered fact based approach is used (Burrows, Finn & Todd, 
Fourthly, abandoning the intention test is contrary to most of 
the theories on the nature of contract, especially, contractual 
liability as voluntarily assumed liability, freedom of contract 
(and freedom from contract as a corollary), and etc. It is also 
contrary to the judicial opinion that intention to create legal 
relations is “the marrow of contractual relationships” (Chwee 
Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594 at 
[139]). 
It is submitted therefore that intention to create a legal rela- 
tion should be kept as a requirement of an enforceable contract, 
whether consideration is also required or not. If something must 
be abolished, then it is consideration rather than the intention to 
create legal relations.  
It is further submitted that the presumptions based on the 
domestic/social and commercial arrangements should also be 
kept. As argued in part III, the underlying value distinction 
between these two categories of agreements remains unchanged. 
The presumptions provide certainty to some extent and that 
they are rebuttable by evidence to the contrary provides flexi- 
bility. The change of social environment may be reflected in 
courts’ interpretation of evidentiary facts and their weights and 
the development of the category of domestic/social agreements. 
7As discussed above, the concept of cause does not correspond to the com-
mon law concept of consideration but relates more to morality or the order 
public, the reason for entering into a contract, and motive or object. See 
Chloros (1968: pp. 145-146). 
8See, for example, Peter Goodrich, “Friends in high places: Amity and 
agreement in Alsatia” (2005) International Journal of Law in Context 41.
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2012: pp. 175-176). For other common law jurisdictions, such 
as Singapore, the English position is also their current position. 
It seems that such a “reform” is a conservative one. Being con-
servative, however, is unnecessarily inappropriate in the mod-
ern era, especially for courts and law. As a New Zealand Chief 
Justice once mentioned, the “Courts and the very law itself … 
are conservative institutions not given to rapid transformation. 
There is nothing wrong [with the law and Courts being conser-
vative institutions not given to rapid transformation]”9. Stability 
and consistency should be important considerations when law 
reform is proposed. 
Conclusion 
As contractual liability stems from the parties’ voluntary or 
intentional assumption of obligations, intention to create legal 
relations is “[t]he marrow of contractual relationships” (Chwee 
Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004] 2 SLR(R) 594 at 
[139]). Intention to create legal relations is necessary for the 
formation of an enforceable contract. On one hand, considera- 
tion (the test of bargain), and the intention required by offer and 
acceptance (with certainty) could be evidence of the parties’ 
serious intention to be bound somehow, but serious intention is 
unnecessarily intention to be legally bound. One the other hand, 
there are many other ways for the parties to prove their inten- 
tion to create legal relations. Therefore, consideration, as with 
offer and acceptance, is neither sufficient nor necessary for the 
proving of intention to create legal relations. The intention to 
create legal relations should not be abandoned. 
It is true that the doctrine of intention to create legal relations 
is not perfect, but the doctrine of consideration is very much 
more problematic. The possibility of abolishing the doctrine of 
consideration, and the possible alternatives have been seriously 
considered and proposed not only by academics, but also by 
official law reform reports and courts in some common law 
jurisdictions. The doctrine of consideration is very unlikely to 
work any better than the doctrine of intention to create legal 
relations. If one of the two tests of enforceability must be 
abandoned, it should be the doctrine of consideration rather 
than intention to create legal relations. 
Although in the modern era, the distinctive underlying value 
promoted by domestic/social agreements (shared interest of the 
parties), significantly different from that of commercial agree- 
ments (the pursuit of each parties’ self-interest), remains un- 
changed. The presumptions based on the domestic/commercial 
distinction remain justifiable. 
In addition to theoretical consistency, stability, harmonisa- 
tion and unification of contract law in the modern global era are 
also important considerations in proposing contract law reform. 
These, in addition to the findings from the comparison of the 
related legal rules in some common law jurisdictions, justifies a 
conservative approach, that is, common law jurisdictions 
should go back to the orthodox (and current) English rule. The 
English law, on one hand, requires the intention to create legal 
relations for an enforceable contract, which makes it look more, 
than the “black letter” of the United States’ law, in line with the 
position in civil law jurisdictions. One the other hand, by the 
adoption of the presumptions and other related evidentiary rules, 
the English rule produces practical effect substantially similar 
to the United States’ rule and properly balances the needs of 
flexibility and certainty. Such a mechanism is also widely ac- 
cepted by other common law jurisdictions to date. Such a re- 
form will not cause an earthquake to contract law in almost all 
common jurisdictions. 
A conservative approach, however, does not mean a com- 
plete inaction forever. This paper submits that if something 
must be abandoned from the prerequisites of formation of a 
contract, the doctrine of consideration may be abandoned by 
common law, but not in the near future. As argued in Part II of 
this paper, an offer necessarily contains a promise by the of- 
feror and the offeree’s acceptance must also contain a promise 
in exchange for the offeror’s promise; consideration could be 
evidence of the parties’ intention to be bound somehow, which 
is already required for offer and acceptance; and intention to be 
legally bound is the fundamental test of enforceability. Aban- 
doning the consideration requirement will not only make con- 
tract law more consistent internally within contract law and 
within the common jurisdictions, but also be desirable for the 
harmonisation and unification of contract law internationally. 
Continental law does not have the consideration concept. The 
problems with the doctrine of consideration and the benefit 
from abandoning this doctrine have been strongly argued for by 
prominent scholars, evidenced by judicial opinions in Singa- 
pore High Court and Court of Appeal, and proposed by the 
United Kingdom Law Commission. Taking into account that 
the civil law concept of “causa” might be (thought) related to 
the common law concept of consideration, a compromise can 
be adopted by making the presence of “reciprocity” a weak 
presumption of the presence of intention to create legal rela- 
tions, similar to what Koo (2011) proposes. At this stage, how- 
ever, a “conservative reformer” would better accept Phang JC’s 
statement in the Singapore Court of Appeal judgment of Gay 
Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie Terrence Peter [2009] 2 SLR(R) 332 
at [118]: 
… the maintenance of the status quo… may well be the 
most practical solution in as much as it will afford the 
courts a range of legal options to achieve a just and fair 
result in the case concerned… [notwithstanding] problems 
of theoretical coherence [Emphasis in original]. 
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